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Proportionality is one of main principles 
scrutinizing actions adopted by national 
authorities which restricts rights under the 
European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
from November, 4th, 1950 (hereinafter – 
ECHR)1. When the arrest of a person 
would be disproportional to the gravity of 
committed crime? How one could balance 
the journalists’ freedom of expression with 
the right to privacy of public person? Such 
and many other issues of conflicts between 
fundamental rights and rights of others 
or public interests has became routine 
technique in the case-law of European Court 
of human rights (hereinafter – ECtHR) 
including the huge number of applications 
brought to Strasbourg from Russia. The 
presentation starts out from general 
1  European Treaty Series, 1950, no. 5; United Na-u
tion Treaty Series, vol., 213, p. 221.
overview of proportionality principle. 
Analysis of both constitutional provisions 
and case-law of modern democracies 
support the argument that this principle 
has the status of international customary 
rule. It seems to be relevant in the light of 
unwritten character of proportionality in 
ECHR. Further it argues on fourth-elements 
structure of proportionality principle 
and considers its application in the cases 
bringing to the ECtHR versus Russia. This 
approach didn’t mean that Russian cases 
are something special just the opposite. 
Those local examples demonstrate the 
general trend in ECtHR case-law on 
proportionality. Simultaneous there are 
some exceptions when ECtHR taking into 
account the transition character of Russian 
economic, political and legal system. Also 
the selection of case-law which illustrates 
the main points on proportionality is 
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connected with importance of particular 
conventional rights to Russian applicants. 
Such selectivity of case-analysis is 
supported by official statistics of ECtHR2. 
This study has in some extent the critical 
approach. There are objections in academia 
against proportionality test such as the 
legitimacy of courts and judge-made law, 
as well as wide discretion and subjectivity 
of judges in this regard. Some of these 
critics will be explored in the connection 
with elements of proportionality.
1. General overview
of proportionality
The starting point of proportionality prin-
ciple analysis is the axiom that freedom 
of the human being can not be absolute. 
Therefore the fundamental rights guaran-
teed in the international legal instruments 
and national constitutions, objectively 
contradict with the necessity for protec-
tion of rights of others and public interests. 
Although the possibility of fundamental 
rights limitation very often leads to arbi-
trary measures taken by public authorities. 
So every democratic society attempts to 
set a proportion between individual rights 
and public aims.
In this connection the remarkable is the 
context in which the proportionality from 
wide philosophical conception became the 
legal status of principle in the field of rights 
protection. The majority of scholars agreed 
2 Statistics for Russia on subject-matter of violation 
judgments show such a importance of convention rights: 
right to a fair trial (Art. 6) – 28%, 11% – right to liberty 
and security (Art. 5), 8% – inhuman or degrading treat-
ment (Art. 3), 23% – protection of property (P1-1) and 
30% – others. Country Statistic on 1 January 2009. URL: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B21D260B-
3559-4FB2-A629-881C66DC3B2F/0/CountryStatis-
tics01012009.pdf (last visited 01.02.2011). 
that the proportionality principle has the 
German roots3. In the modern doctrine of 
state law and practice of Federal Consti-
tutional Court of Germany the principle 
of proportionality in a wide sense [Verh­
altnismaesigkeitsprinzip] or ban of exces-
siveness [Uebermaessverbot] traditionally 
consists of three elements (sub-principles): 
1) suitability [Geeignetheit], i.e. applica-
tion of means which really reach desirable
result; 2) necessities [Erforderlichkeit], as-
suming that used measures do is minimum
possible harm to the rights unlike pro-
spective application of alternative means;
3) proportionality in strict sense [Zumut­
barkeit, Angemessenheit, Proporlionali­
tat] according to which restriction of fun-
damental rights should be in an optimum
parity with protected public values. In one
of the latest works devoted to a principle
of proportionality, the professor of Hum-
boldt University (Berlin) B. Schlink un-
derlines that “from elements of legitimate
aim, suitability and necessity of means it
has extended to a proportionality element
in strict sense which demands that the aim
pursued by the state and burdening the
citizen means stood in a proper correlation
each other on value, a rank, weight, value,
importance, quality or force”4.
3ARNAULD, von A. Die normtheoretische Be-
gruendung des Verhaeltnismaessigkeitsgrundsatzes. 
Juristische Zeitung. 2000, h. 6, s. 276–280; BLECK-
MANN, A. Begruendung und Anwendungsbereich des 
Verhaeltnismaessigkeitsprinzips. Juristische Schulung, 
1994, h. 3, s. 177–183; ERICHSEN, H.-U. Das Ue-
bermassverbot. Jura, 1988, s. 387–388; KREBS, W. 
Zur verfassungsrechtlichen Verortung und Anwendung 
des uebermassverbotes. Jura, 2001, h. 4, s. 228–234;  
OSSENBUEHL, F. Masshalten mit dem 
Uebermassver-bot. Wege und Verfahren des 
Verfassungslebens: Festschrift fuer Peter Lerche zum 65. 
Geburtstag / hrsg. BADURA, P. von; SCHOLZ, R. 
Muenchen, 1993, s. 151–164.
4 SCHLINK, B. Der Grundsatz der Verhaeltnis-
maessigkeit. Festschrift 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungs­
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2. proportionality as unwritten 
principle in ECHR and  
international custom as justification 
of its application by eCtHR
Besides the historical roots the important 
theoretical question concerning the 
proportionality is its form and place in the 
text of ECHR. As M.-A. Eissen observed 
in the one of the first separate research on 
proportionality and case-law of ECtHR 
it has “thinly veiled form”5. Although 
the unwritten principles are regularly 
applicable in common law in Russian 
context it’s very hard to use such a rough 
notion as unwritten law both for academia 
and courts. For example when Supreme 
Court of Russian Federation starts to 
use bona fides in the cases concerning 
the abuse of workers rights6 it follow to 
the resistance from Russian labour law 
publicist. Some of Russian scholars really 
think that “possibility of application 
by courts of the principle which is not 
containing in a positive law, would 
contradict with the essence of justice”7. 
Similar approach used in German Basic 
Law [Grund Gesetz]. It has also no textual 
gericht / BADURA, P.; DREIER, H. Bd. 2. Tubingen, 
2001, s. 447.
5 EISSEN, M.-A. The principle of proportionality in 
the Case-Law of the European Court of Human rights, 
European system for the protection of Human rights / 
ed. by MACDONALD, R. S. J., MATSCHER, F., PET-
ZOLD, H. Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1993, p. 125.
6 para. 27 of the Decision of Plenum of the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation from March, 17th, 2004 
№ 2 (as amended from December, 28th, 2006) “About 
application of the Labour Code of the Russian Federa-
tion by courts of the Russian Federation”. Bulletin of the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 2004, nr. 6; 
2007, nr. 3.
7 KRUCHININ, A. V. The Forms of abusing right 
by labour contract parties (on judicial practice materi-
als) [in Russian]. Bulletin of the Udmurt university. Ju­
risprudence, 2005. nr. 6, p. 140.
ground of proportionality. And this test “in 
Germany is an unwritten constitutional 
rule derived from the principle of the rule 
of law”8. 
Such a unwritten character of pro-
portionality principle is caused the ne-
cessity of more precisely argumentation 
for its application in the Russian legal 
system. As such justification can be seen 
the theory of international customary law. 
International custom defined “as evidence 
of general practice recognized by states as 
legally binding rules”9. So in the case-law 
of International Court of Justice (hereinaf-
ter – ICJ) the international custom divided 
into two main elements: 1) objective (gen-
eral practice of state) and 2) subjective 
(“accepted as law” or opinio juris)10. ICJ 
holds in the Continental Shelf case (Libya 
v. Malta) that the substance of custom-
ary international law must be “looked for 
primarily in the actual practice and opinio 
juris of States”11. This theory has reason 
in the light of lack of tradition with ap-
plication of unwritten legal principles in 
Russian national courts. Custom is the 
regular source for international law so it 
can be and must be used by international 
tribunals. As ECtHR holds that ECHR 
“should so far as possible be interpreted in 
harmony with other rules of international 
8 SULLIVAN, T. E. Proportionality principles in 
American law: controlling excessive government ac-
tions / SULLIVAN, T. E.; FRASE, R. S. Oxford, 2009, 
p. 29.
9 art. 38 of Statute of the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice of League of Nation from1920, 16th 
of December. URL: http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/
eng/documents/1920.12.16_statute.htm (last visited 
03.03.2011).
10 Nicaragua v. US (Merits). ICJ Reports, 1986, 
p. 14, 97.
11 ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 29.
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law of which it forms part” (para. 35, 36)12 
it can be argued that comparative analy-
sis demonstrates the existence of general 
state practice13 on proportionality as ob-
jective element of international custom 
(the majority of countries have common 
approach of this concept). Together with 
opinio juris (as subjective element of in-
ternational custom) this approach makes 
the application of proportionality principle 
by ECtHR more formal and legitimate in 
the light of its unwritten character in the 
text of ECHR. The use of state practice by 
judges and consent of public authorities 
with binding force of principle or rule con-
cern will create the international custom-
ary law which obliging to obey the states’ 
obligations. 
3. Fourth-elements structure  
of proportionality and eCtHR  
case-law vs Russia
Bearing in the mind the above-mentioned 
state practice and case-law of ECtHR, it is 
12 Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 
no. 37112/97, ECHR 2001-XI – (21.11.01)
13 Most significant examples show the Law of Euro-
pean Union (art. 52 (1) of Charter of fundamental rights 
of the European Union from December, 7th, 2000; para. 
96 of Judgment of the Court of 5 May 1998 C-180/96 
«United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
v Commission of the European Communities» // Eu-
ropean Court reports. 1998. P. I-02265), Canada (sec-
tion 1 of Charter of the rights and freedom from April, 
17th, 1982, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/loireg/charte/const_en.html; 
Regina v. Oakes, decided on February, 28. 1986 [Oaks 
Case] // Reports of the Supreme Court of Canada. 1986. 
Vol. 1. P. 103–143) and South Africa (s. 36 of Constitu-
tion of the Republic of South Africa, adopted on 8 May 
1996 approved by the Constitutional Court (CC) on 4 
December 1996 and took effect on 4 February 1997. 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/
index.htm; S v Makwanyane and Another: Constitu-
tional Court, South Africa 1995 CCT 3/1994, 1995 (6) 
BCLR 665 (CC) http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/
Archimages/2353.PDF)
possible to assume that the proportionality 
principle includes four elements: 1) legiti-
mate aim, 2) suitability, 3) less restrictive 
mean and 4) balancing.
3.1. Legitimate aim and evidences  
in international litigation
The precondition of proportionality prin-
ciple analysis or even its first element is 
the requirement of legitimate aim which 
national authorities must prove in order to 
restrict fundamental rights. It presupposes 
an assessment by ECtHR the importance 
of grounds for which rights restriction is 
established. Only really important and le-
gitimate public aim provides the admis-
sible rights restrictions. This requirement 
is contradicted with the restrictions caused 
by illegal interests or social prejudices.
ECHR directly defines this rule in art. 
18: “the restrictions permitted under this 
Convention to the said rights and freedoms 
shall not be applied for any purpose other 
than those for which they have been 
prescribed”. In general such a purpose of 
restrictions are defined by the category 
“necessary in a democratic society” 
(art. 6 (1); art. 8 (2); art. 9 (2); art. 10 (2); 
art 11 (2); art. 1 of Protocol № 1; art. 2 (3) 
of Protocol № 4; art. 2 of Protocol № 7). 
This general category specified in many 
public interests and objectives mentioned 
in the text of ECHR: “national security” 
(art. 6 (2); art. 8 (2); art. 9 (2); art. 10 (2); 
art. 11 (3); art. 2 of Protocol № 4), “public 
order” (art. 6 (1), art. 8 (2), art. 9 (2), art. 
10 (2), art. 11 (2), art. 2 (3) of Protocol 
№ 4), “health” (art. 8 (2); art. 9 (2); art. 10 (2); 
art. 11(2); art. 2 (3)of Protocol № 4), 
“morals” (art. 6 (1); art. 8 (2); art. 9 (2); 
art. 10 (2), art. 11 (2), art. 2 (3)of Protocol 
№ 4), “protection of the rights and freedoms 
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of others” (art. 6 (1); art. 8 (2); art. 9 (2); 
art. 10 (2); art. 11 (2), art. 2 (3) of Protocol 
№ 4), “economic well-being of the 
country” (art. 8 (2)); “territorial integrity” 
(art. 10 (2)); “interests of justice” (art. 
6 (1); art. 10 (2)) etc.
Despite the various formulations, all 
these concepts could be deduced to the 
protection or the rights of other persons or 
public interests. The given two categories 
also act as the general basis of restriction 
of convention rights. There are no doubts 
that all mentioned concepts are abstract 
enough and therefore allow the national 
authorities to justify absolute majority of 
rights restrictions. Although ECtHR of 
importance and legitimacy of the purposes 
which prove such restrictions.
Case-Law of ECtHR shows that na-
tional authorities not always have suffi-
cient grounds for restriction of rights. In 
particular, in the case of “Burdov v. Rus-
sia” (Judgment from May, 7th, 2002) 
ECtHR holds that delays in the execution 
of the judgments constituted an interfer-
ence with property rights of applicant (art. 
1 of Protocol № 1). This conclusion caused 
by the assessment of ECtHR that “Govern-
ment have not advanced any justification 
for this interference and the Court consid-
ers that a lack of funds cannot justify such 
an omission”14. In this case lack of budget 
resources, according to the ECtHR, is not 
the legitimate purpose which could prove 
such a restriction of right.
The similar reasons ECtHR used in 
case “Kormacheva v. Russia” (Judgment 
from January, 29th, 2004). For justification 
of restriction of the right to a fair trail 
(art. 6) Government cited mainly objective 
14 Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, § 41, ECHR 
2002-III
difficulties faced by Russian courts in 
the case of the applicant, such as the lack 
of staff, poor technical condition of its 
building and geographical remoteness. 
ECtHR has disagreed with Government 
arguments and has considered “that these 
difficulties do not excuse the State from 
ensuring that the proceedings were dealt 
with within a reasonable time”15.
In the Judgment from May, 19th, 2004 
“Gusinsky v. Russia” ECtHR finds as un-
reasonable the restriction of the right to 
liberty and security (art. 5) for the purpose 
of acquisition by the Government of appli-
cant’s private company. As ECtHR stated 
“it is not the purpose of such public-law 
matters as criminal proceedings and de-
tention on remand to be used as part of 
commercial bargaining strategies … appli-
cant’s prosecution was used to intimidate 
him”16.
3.2. Suitability and the problem  
of Judicial Legitimacy
This element presupposes testing of po-
tential possibility if the chosen by national 
governments restrictive means achieve 
desirable aim. Relationship between mean 
and aim should be rational and not lead 
to absurd results or unreasonableness (ra-
tionality test). Unreasonableness is well-
known doctrine which applied, for exam-
ple, by English courts (Wednesbury test)17. 
15 Kormacheva v. Russia, no. 53084/99, § 55, 29 
January 2004
16 Gusinskiy v. Russia, no. 70276/01, § 76, ECHR 
2004-IV
17 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. 
Wednesbury Corporation: Judgment of Royal Courts 
of Justice from 10 November 1947 // England and 
Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions. 
1947. 1. URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/
Civ/1947/1.html (last visited 01.02.2011) or [1947] 2 
all er 680
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Lord Greene explains the concept of “un-
reasonable” in relation to exercise of statu-
tory discretions “as a general description 
of the things that must not be done. For in-
stance, a person entrusted with a discretion 
must, so to speak, direct himself properly 
in law. He must call his own attention to 
the matters which he is bound to consider. 
He must exclude from his consideration 
matters which are irrelevant to what he has 
to consider. If he does not obey those rules, 
he may truly be said, and often is said, to 
be acting “unreasonably”. Similarly, there 
may be something so absurd that no sen-
sible person could ever dream that it lay 
within the powers of the authority”. 
The suitability requirement has 
expressed implicitly in the text of the ECHR. 
The provisions of art. 5 (3) presupposed 
arrest or detention as suitable restriction of 
the right to liberty and security only within 
the reasonable terms of proceeding. Lack 
of reasonable connection between the 
purpose (prevention of crime) and mean 
(liberty’s restriction) leads to violation of 
suitability requirement. ECtHR has used 
such interpretation of suitability in the 
case “Kalashnikov vs. Russia” (Judgment 
from July, 15th 2002). In spite of legitimate 
aims to restriction of the right to liberty 
and security ECtHR holds it as unsuitable. 
According to the opinion of ECtHR, 
applicant’s offences “could initially suffice 
to warrant the applicant’s detention. 
However, as the proceedings progressed 
and the collection of the evidence became 
complete that ground inevitably became 
less relevant”18. Hence, during the certain 
period the restriction of right in question 
became unsuitable.
18 Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99, § 117, 
eCHr 2002-VI.
Using considered criterion, ECtHR has 
formulated similar positions in the case 
“Smirnova v. Russia” (Judgment from 
July, 24th 2003) recognizing unsuitable the 
withholding of passport as restriction of the 
right to private life (art. 8) in connection 
fraud proceedings of twin sisters. ECtHR 
has analyzed in detail the possibility 
of achievement by the given mean the 
purposes specified in art. 8 (2). ECtHR 
ruled that “the withholding of the passport 
did not serve the interests of national 
security because the charges of fraud 
were not amongst crimes undermining 
fundamental principles of Constitutional 
system or State security. National security 
would not have suffered, had the applicant 
been able to find a job, go to a clinic, 
marry etc. Nor was the applicant’s offence 
a threat to public safety. And, in any event, 
without a passport Y.S. would have been 
able to threaten public safety had she so 
wished, as well as if she had the document. 
The withholding of the passport could not 
improve the economic well-being of the 
country, lead to public disorder or crime. 
It did not serve the interests of protecting 
health or morals or the rights and 
freedoms of others. It was not necessary 
in a democratic society either”19. eCtHr 
has come actually to the conclusion about 
absurd of rights restriction. «The only 
reason the authorities gave for keeping 
the passport in the case file was their own 
convenience of telling Elena Smirnova 
(one of twin sister. – A.D.) from her twin 
sister. This reason was not only beyond the 
law but also beyond common sense as it 
is not clear how attaching the passport to 
the case file could make her identification 
easier” (para. 93).
19 Smirnova v. Russia, № 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 
92, ECHR 2003-IX.
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At the same time suitability require-
ment presupposes the self-restraint of 
ECtHR in order to guarantee the Judicial 
Legitimacy. The above-mentioned Wends-
bury test is well-known example of judi-
cial self-restraint likewise. The Court in 
this judgment not only has rejected the 
applicant’s argument on unreasonableness 
of provisions that no child under the age 
of sixteen should be admitted to this cin-
ematograph theatre on Sunday, but also 
remind that “proposition that the decision 
of the local authority can be upset if it is 
proved to be unreasonable, really meant 
that it must be proved to be unreason-
able in the sense that the court considers 
it to be a decision that no reasonable body 
could have come to. It is not what the court 
considers unreasonable, a different thing 
altogether. If it is what the court consid-
ers unreasonable, the court may very well 
have different views […] The effect of the 
legislation is not to set up the court as an 
arbiter of the correctness of one view over 
another. It is the local authority that are set 
in that position and, provided they act, as 
they have acted, within the four corners of 
their jurisdiction, this court, in my opinion, 
cannot interfere”. 
Such logic should be applied to the 
case-law of ECtHR and connected with the 
Margin of Appreciation and Subsidiarity 
doctrines. These doctrines actually bring 
up the problem of legitimacy of ECtHR 
itself. In the Judgment of December, 18th 
1986 ECtHR gives its own solution to the 
problem: “Although it is not normally the 
Court’s task to review the observance of 
domestic law by the national authorities, it 
is otherwise in relation to matters where, as 
here, the Convention refers directly back 
to that law; for, in such matters, disregard 
of the domestic law entails breach of the 
Convention, with the consequence that the 
Court can and should exercise a certain 
power of review. However, the logic of 
the system of safeguard established by the 
Convention sets limits on the scope of this 
review. It is in the first place for the national 
authorities, notably the courts, to interpret 
and apply the domestic law, even in those 
fields where the Convention “incorporates” 
the rules of that law: the national authorities 
are, in the nature of things, particularly 
qualified to settle the issues arising in this 
connection”(para. 58)20. So the national 
law-making bodies should in the first place 
predict the possibility of achievement by 
means (restriction of rights) the protected 
purpose (public interests or values). In 
international litigation the hypothesis about 
a reality of such achievement should be 
initially justified by national governments, 
but can be assessed by ECtHR. If mean 
have been defined by ECtHR as unsuitable 
or unreasonable the further scrutiny of 
proportionality can not be required. On 
the contrary, even means which is suitable 
could contradict with further elements of 
proportionality principle.
3.3. Less restrictive mean  
and judicial law-making
Less restrictive mean (hereinafter – LRM) 
as an element of proportionality assumes 
20 Bozano v. France – Series A no. 111, p. 25, para. 
58 (18.12.86). See also among other this principle in case 
of Sherstobitov v. Russia (Application no. 16266/03) 
The Court reiterates that … “in the first place, it is for 
the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret 
and apply domestic law, the position is different in rela-
tion to cases where […] failure to comply with that law 
entails a breach of the Convention. In such cases the 
Court can and should exercise a certain power to review 
whether national law has been observed”. – Sherstobitov 
v. Russia, no. 16266/03 (Sect. 1) – (10.6.10), para. 110.
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presence and a choice of alternative means 
which are less restrictive or minimal for 
rights-holders if government has no ad-
ditional costs (organizational, financial). 
LRM requirement could be defined as 
minimality. Harm which is caused to the 
rights-holders should be less, than the ad-
vantage received from limitation of their 
possible abuse of convention rights. The 
aim should really needs the chosen mean 
that why this sub-principle of proportion-
ality is known also as necessity test.
Example of explicit provisions of 
ECHR defining LRM requirement is lit. 
“b”, art. 4 (3) according to which work in 
case of conscientious objectors is mildest 
means limiting labour freedom as com-
pared to compulsory military service.
The LRM requirement is widely ap-
plied by ECtHR scrutinizing the legal 
responsibility and selecting its mildest 
alternative measures. In the case “Kalash-
nikov vs. Russian” (para. 95) ECtHR has 
noticed that in the case of imprisonment 
“ill-treatment must attain a minimum level 
of severity … the State must ensure that 
a person is detained in conditions which 
are compatible with respect for his human 
dignity, that the manner and method of the 
execution of the measure do not subject 
him to distress or hardship of an intensity 
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffer-
ing inherent in detention and that, given 
the practical demands of imprisonment, 
his health and well-being are adequately 
secured”. Factually in this case ECtHR 
predict to the States to minimize a conse-
quence of such rights restrictions as im-
prisonment or shows to them on necessity 
of alternative, less restrictive measures. In 
particular ECtHR has defined such mild-
est means. ECtHR makes the reference to 
the case-law of the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment of Punishment 
which has set 7 sq. m per prisoner as “an 
approximate, desirable guideline for a de-
tention cell” (para. 97). At the same time 
during the different periods of applicant’s 
detention this area was much less (from 
0,9 to 1,9 sq.).
Also the conclusion about lack of LRM 
contains in the case Ilaşcu and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia (Judgment from 
July, 8th, 2004) in which as unreasonable 
restriction of prohibition of torture (art. 
3) detention of the applicant in inhuman 
conditions was recognized. As ECtHR 
has stressed “measures depriving a person 
of his liberty are usually accompanied by 
such suffering and humiliation. Article 
3 requires the State to ensure that every 
prisoner is detained in conditions which 
are compatible with respect for his human 
dignity, that the manner and method of the 
execution of the measure do not subject 
him to distress or hardship of an intensity 
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering 
inherent in detention and that, given the 
practical demands of imprisonment, his 
health and well-being are adequately 
secured”21. Hence, presence of LRM does 
not allow the national authorities to use 
such limitations of fundamental rights.
In this regard the LRM requirement 
connected with the question of involvement 
of judicial bodies in to law-making 
process and their possible interference into 
competence of national political actors. 
Definition by ECtHR of alternative LRM 
actually lead not only to negative but also 
to positive judicial law-making. 
21  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 
no. 48787/99, § 428, ECHR 2004-VII
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3.4. Balancing and subjectivity  
of judges
This element (proportionality in strict 
sense) is directed on achievement of op-
timum balance of individual and public 
values. Conflicting right and public in-
terest should be weighed on their impor-
tance in a scale of values set up in ECHR. 
In contrast to previous elements of pro-
portionality, which were connected with 
“means (restriction of right) – aims (public 
interests) relation”, balancing involves two 
competing values, on one hand, certain 
fundamental right and on another – pub-
lic interest. In this respect the last element 
of proportionality is one of main judicial 
technique in the decision-making process. 
As ECtHR in the early case-law (Spor-
rong and Lonnroth v. Sweden) have been 
determined that search for the balance of 
“the general interest of the community and 
the requirements of the protection of the 
individual’s fundamental rights … is in-
herent in the whole of the Convention”22. 
Although not all judges was agreed with 
such a conclusion predicting the possible 
clash of ECtHR with national political ac-
tors. As judge Terje Wold pointed much 
more earlier in his partly dissenting opin-
ion that “even worse is the interpretation 
by the majority that the Convention ‘im-
plies a just balance between the protection 
of the general interest of the community 
and the respect due to fundamental hu-
man rights’. I strongly disagree with this 
interpretation. In my opinion it carries the 
Court into the very middle of the internal 
political questions of each Member State, 
22  Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 
1982, § 69, Series A no. 52
which it has never been the intention that 
the Court should deal with”23.
In “Russian cases” the fair balance no-
tion is also clearly expressed. As balancing 
the public interests and rights to liberty in 
the case “Smirnova vs. Russia”, ECtHR 
has noticed that «continued detention can 
be justified in a given case only if there are 
specific indications of a genuine require-
ment of public interest which, notwith-
standing the presumption of innocence, 
outweighs the rule of respect for individual 
liberty» (art. 61). The category mentioned 
by ECtHR “weighing” includes the obliga-
tion of national Parliament to select such 
means of rights restriction which would 
allow the possible enjoinment of each 
values in question. 
The process of balancing is presup-
posed the subjectivity of judges which 
always in adjudication assessing the argu-
ments of litigating parties. It’s the nature 
of litigation itself and the courts as arbiters 
in cases. Comparing the national judges 
which firstly examined the case the inter-
national judges as in ECtHR can be more 
objective or could help to transform the 
values common to particular nation and 
country. In this regard the national courts 
may be bounded by political, social con-
dition and even prejudices significantly 
than international tribunals. An example 
of tension between common to all mem-
bers of Councils of Europe values on one 
hand and cultural prejudices exciting in 
Russia on the other demonstrates the case 
of Case of Konstantin Markin v. Rus-
sia24. Examining this case Constitutional 
23  Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on 
the use of languages in education in Belgium” (merits), 
23 July 1968, § 101, Series A no. 6
24  Case of Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Applica-
tion no. 30078/06) Judgment from 7 October 2010
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Court rejected the serviceman applica-
tion on challenging the statutory prohi-
bition from combining the performance 
of his military duties with parental leave 
taking more weight to special legal status 
of the military and duty to defend the Fa-
therland25. As an opposite ECtHR consid-
ers that “the advancement of the equality 
of the sexes is today a major goal in the 
member States of the Council of Europe 
and very weighty reasons would have to 
be put forward before such a difference of 
treatment could be regarded as compatible 
with the Convention … it cannot overlook 
the widespread and consistently develop-
ing views and associated legal changes to 
the domestic laws of Contracting States 
on this issue” (para. 47). And as a result 
ECtHR concluded that “the Constitutional 
Court based its decision on a pure assump-
tion, without attempting to probe its valid-
ity by checking it against statistical data or 
by weighing the conflicting interests … the 
difference was founded on the traditional 
gender roles, that is on the perception of 
women as primary child-carers and men as 
primary breadwinners, these gender preju-
dices cannot, by themselves, be considered 
by the Court to amount to sufficient jus-
tification for the difference in treatment, 
any more than similar prejudices based 
on race, origin, colour or sexual orienta-
tion” (para. 49). However the subjectivity 
of judges still remained the critical issue 
in the regard of balancing the competing 
conventional rights and public values.
25  Russian Constitutional Court 187-О-О Decision 
of Jan. 15, 2009
Conclusions
Due Margin of Appreciation doctrine and 
jurisdictions of ECtHR national authori-
ties possesses certain discretion upon set-
ting the proportionality of conventional 
rights restriction. Simultaneously, being 
the one of main principle of conventional 
rights protection, the proportionality pre-
determines possibility of the international 
judicial review of national restrictive mea-
sures. Legitimate aim as precondition of 
this principle considered. In the definition 
of reasonability requirement (legitimate 
aim) the arguments of the Government 
which justify restrictions of the convention 
rights, and also assessment by ECtHR of 
victims’ counterarguments are important. 
Observance of a principle of proportional-
ity in a wide sense demands three consecu-
tive stages. 1) Suitability means check of 
main possibility of achievement by means 
of the desirable aim. Means and the pur-
pose should be in reasonable relation. 
2) Minimality assumes presence and a 
choice of alternative means which are less 
restrictive for conventional rights. The aim 
should demand really means. 3) Balancing 
(proportionality in strict sense) is directed 
on weighing of clashing individual and 
public values. The given criterion will be 
broken, if outcomes of conventional rights 
restrictions outweighs advantage reached 
from prevention its abuse.
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